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penetration rates in Germany, the largest logistics market in Europe. In light of the upcoming trade 
barriers, we intend to move this topic forward by emphasising its interdisciplinary nature. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Based on the analysis of Eurostat data, expert interviews, and 
a review of related literature, we elaborate and discuss four propositions related to the factors 
affecting cabotage penetration, future cabotage levels, and the effects on modal split and empty 
runs. 
 
Findings  – We found that cabotage in Germany plays a more important role than officially 
reported and has increased drastically since 2008. Given our analysis, increased cabotage 
penetration seems to thwart efforts within the EU to promote a modal shift from road to rail and 
increased national empty runs are the future outcome of current regulations. In Germany, the 
cabotage share is likely to reach 16 percent in the next five years. 
 
Research implications  – This paper highlights the need for incorporating a more contextual 
understanding in freight carrier selection theory development in general as well as country specific 
investigations in particular. 
 
Practical implications  – Logistics managers and policymakers looking at future strategies are 
advised to take the ongoing deregulation trend into consideration. European freight movement 
using cabotage operators may represent significant cost savings; however, these cost savings come 
at an environmental and social sustainability price as the modal shift to rail and fill rates suffer. 
 
Originality/value  – This paper represents an empirical and unbiased point of view, in contrast to 
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Economists generally agree that the deregulation of a market, such as the road freight transport 
market, leads to increased efficiency and lower prices for consumers (Ying and Keeler, 1991; 
Vogelsang, 2002; Lafontaine and Valeri, 2009). Nevertheless, trucking deregulation in both North 
America (Belzer, 2000; Belman and Monaco, 2001; Belman et al., 2005) and Europe (Hilal, 2008; 
Kummer et al., 2014) have not been without negative impacts. Investigations of the European 
Union (EU) deregulation found negative effects on 1) social sustainability (e.g. adverse working 
conditions of foreign truck drivers) (Hilal, 2008; AK EUROPA, 2014; Broughton et al., 2015; 
Mabasa, 2018) and 2) the environment (e.g. increased emissions) (Hendrickx, 2013; Sternberg et 
al., 2015). Supply chain and sustainability managers of well-known brands such as IKEA or 
BRING have been negatively affected by bad publicity of adverse conditions among their freight 
service providers, as those have been given attention in mainstream media (BBC, 2017; Mabasa, 
2018). Understanding the changing freight transport supply is important for logistics managers of 
international networks (Olhager et al., 2015) as well as actors such as sustainability managers 
monitoring a firm’s network (Marshall et al., 2016; Nakamba et al., 2017). 
 A focus of the European trucking deregulation has been the debate surrounding cabotage,1 
which is the transport of goods or passengers between two places in the same country by a transport 
operator from another country. For years, the discourse about cabotage has been one of the main 
concerns for logisticians (Mangan and Lalwani, 2016; Nakamba et al., 2017; Paixão Casaca and 
Lyridis, 2018), numerous logistics and trucking associations, as well as unions who are working 
                                              
1 The term “cabotage” originates from the maritime industry, and specifically from the French word caboter, 
meaning to travel by the coast. The modern meaning is however referring to any mode of transport operated between 
two destinations domestically by a foreign operator. 
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to influence cabotage regulation, monitoring, and enforcement (e.g. COWI, 2015; Kummer et al., 
2017; Falk and Danielsson, 2018). 
 The EU road freight market has gradually been deregulated since 1994, when transportation 
between the EU countries was deregulated. In 2006, the cabotage market was opened up to certain 
member states and in 2009 and 2012 respectively, groups of EU12 member states2 were allowed 
for the first time to conduct cabotage transports in the EU. In May 2010, European Commission 
(EC) No 1072/2009 marked an end to the country specific interpretations by coordinating all 
national cabotage rules. A crucial point was the replacement of the previous directive formulation 
“temporary basis” with an exact time limit. From that moment on, the “three-in-seven” rule was 
in place, i.e. every haulier is entitled to perform up to three cabotage operations within a seven-
day period, starting the day after the unloading of the international transport with which they 
entered the domestic market. The so-called “cabotage directive”3 (Schmidt, 2006, p. 119; Falk and 
Danielsson, 2018), has sparked much public debate and the opinions on its current and future 
effects differ (e.g., Finger, 2014; Di Gianni, 2015; Lewandowski, 2016; Refslund and Thörnquist, 
2016; Šimurková and Poliak, 2019). 
 The EC, for example, fosters further deregulation to reduce empty runs and to create a single 
European transport market where any haulier, regardless of the EU member state of origin, can 
perform transport operations across the EU (European Commission, 2013; Teleroute, 2018). A 
further common argument in favour of deregulation is that it strengthens competition and therefore 
                                              
2 The 12 countries that joined the EU in or after 2004. EU has, as of now, 27 countries, where the countries that 
joined before 2004 are referred to as EU15 (or “old member states”). It should be noted though, that EU15 
technically are 14 countries after Brexit, however as “EU14” is not (yet) an established term, we use the term EU15 
for consistency with previous literature, in particular grey literature. 
3 Formal name of the directive is: “Regulation (EC) No 1072/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 October 2009 on common rules for access to the international road haulage market”   
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reduces overall transport costs (Ying and Keeler, 1991; Visser and Francke, 2010). However, 
hauliers in EU15 are against further market opening because of the significant operations costs 
differences between EU12 and EU15 countries that have led to wage pressure, flagging out,4 and 
the bankruptcy of hauliers within EU15 countries (Kummer et al., 2014). According to Eurostat 
data from 2008 to 2018 for Code “H” Transportation and Storage workers, Bulgarian, Czech, and 
Polish drivers earn only a fraction of what their German counterparts earn—16, 40, and 33 percent 
on average, respectively (Eurostat, 2020a, 2020b). Clearly, in spite of the intended positive effects 
of the road freight market deregulation, negative accompaniments of the current form of European 
freight market deregulation seem to be prevalent (Sternberg and Lantz, 2018). 
 In 2017, most of the goods in the EU28 were transported by road, 76.7 percent based on 
tonne-kilometre (TKM). According to Gleave et al. (2013), four different types of transportation 
exist: 1) national transport by domestic hauliers, i.e. national road freight transport in France 
undertaken by French hauliers. 2) cabotage, e.g. national road freight transport in France 
undertaken by an Italian haulier. 3) cross-trade, e.g. road freight transport between Poland and 
Italy undertaken by a haulier registered in France. 4) bilateral transport, e.g. road freight transport 
between Italy and France undertaken by a haulier registered either in France or in Italy (see Figure 
1). It should be noted that neither these four categories nor Eurostat include transports carried out 
within Council Directive 92/106/EEC (1992) on common rules for certain types of combined 
transport of goods between Member States (Falk and Danielsson, 2018). 
 
                                              
4 “Flagging in” is the process of adding a vessel (or truck) to the national registry and “flagging out” is the process of 
removing a vessel (or a truck) from a national registry. Generally flagging out refers to the practice of switching the 




National and international road haulage operations (Gleave et al., 2013, p. 19) 
 
 Early logistics and supply chain papers have emphasized the importance of studying 
European deregulation (Pfohl, 1993; Bagchi and Skjott-Larsen, 1995), yet the research in the area 
of road freight is still scarce. This is astonishing, as the ongoing academic discussions on market 
deregulations and their consequences show in the maritime business (e.g., Miller and Deacon, 
2017; Paixão Casaca and Lyridis, 2018), in the airline sector (e.g., Button, 2017; Williams, 2017; 
Czerny et al., 2018), or the rail freight segment (e.g., Crozet, 2016; Laroche et al., 2017). In 
general, one could currently get the impression that there is a renaissance of the discussion of 
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international trade regulations—examples include the current US-China trade war (Liu and Woo, 
2018; Fuchs et al., 2019) and Brexit (Dhingra et al., 2016; Swinbank, 2017). 
 Given the millions of transportation workers in Europe, the economic benefits of 
deregulation, the social and environmental sustainability challenges of the industry, and the 
importance to shippers, this paper sets out to explore the scarcely researched European trucking 
deregulation, its role in the transport markets, and the implications for logistics (Pfohl, 1993; 
Baron, 1995; Koliousis et al., 2019). The effects of the ongoing deregulation and the uncertainty 
of future development is a major concern for policymakers and logistics managers (Mangan and 
Lalwani, 2016). As emphasized by researchers such as Pagell et al. (2018), the intersection 
between public policy and supply chain management (SCM) is important but under-researched. 
Failure to take major trends and policy directions into consideration when carrying out supply 
chain and logistics research creates contextual inaccuracy, particularly in sustainability research 
(Marcucci et al., 2017). Hence, the aim of this paper is to explore European freight market 
deregulation using transport economics to highlight one changing and crucial facet of the logistics 
landscape (i.e. the shift from domestic operators to cabotage operators) and provide managerial 
and policy implications. Two research questions aid our exploration: 
RQ1: How are cabotage penetration rates changing? As shippers and hauliers are planning 
the future of their freight procurement strategy and make fleet considerations, the future 
cabotage penetration rates are an important parameter.5 The development of cabotage 
penetration rates indicates the degree of freight deregulation and internationalization in road 
                                              
5 Transport is partly a derived demand and partly a strategic decision. Transport decisions are made in network 
planning, when supply chain managers are optimizing cost, service levels, facility localization etc., typically with a 
planning horizon of 5–10 years (Olhager et al., 2015). 
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freight markets and thus gives decision makers a hint where, in geographic terms, to source 
transportation services (Holter et al., 2008). 
RQ2: What effect has increased cabotage within Germany had on the desired modal shift to 
rail and national empty runs? Unlike trucking, rail transportation takes significant planning 
and is often a long-term strategic decision. Contracts on intermodal terminals typically run 10 
to 20 years. The strategic aspect, as well as the agenda of the EC to promote modal shift from 
road to rail (Ambra et al., 2019; European Commission, 2019), makes this question important 
to address. 
 Our aim is to aid future theory development on road transportation and regulation as well as 
to provide direction for supply chain and logistics managers, public authorities, and policymakers 
by elaborating on empirically derived propositions. For logistics managers, we provide important 
transport considerations for international freight transportation (Olhager et al., 2015). As a unit of 
analysis, we are using the European road freight transport deregulation and the case of Germany, 
the largest logistics market in Europe. We do so by formulating propositions, discussing the 
influencing factors, and conducting scenario analysis of the current and future implications of 
freight deregulation for the German transport sector to elaborate on the suggested propositions and 
answer the research questions. This paper sets the stage for future theorizing on an under-
researched topic of utmost relevance to both researchers and policymakers (Pfohl, 1993). The 
contextual perspective we present is important in aiding future research based on empirical data 
from the world’s largest market, the EU. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 contains the research methodology. Section 4 presents the research 
propositions. In Section 5 the propositions are elaborated on and discussed. Finally, in Section 6, 
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we conclude with future research directions as well as important implications for managers and 
policymakers. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Research on road freight cabotage 
Unlike the European freight market deregulation, the deregulation following the U.S. Motor 
Carrier Act (MCA) of 1980 has been examined in numerous papers and reports. Researchers are 
generally positive about the effects of deregulation on operational measures and the significant 
reductions of shipping costs that have remained low after the initial adjustment to deregulation 
(Ying and Keeler, 1991; Vogelsang, 2002; Loeb and Clarke, 2007; Cantor et al., 2017). New firms 
entered the full truck load (FTL) segment whereas the less than truckload (LTL) saw fewer and 
larger firms (Kling, 1990). Efficiency gains were achieved by the dissolution of private fleets, 
enabling hauliers to move goods from more shippers and achieve economies of scale (Ying, 1990). 
While the shippers were profiting from lower transport costs, rail transport decreased its share of 
the total transportation (Moore, 1986) and driver working conditions deteriorated for some sectors 
of the industry (Belzer, 2000; Belman and Monaco, 2001; Belman et al., 2005; Broughton et al., 
2015). 
 While the U.S. MCA of 1980 was a domestic affair, EU deregulation (which is still 
ongoing) is significantly more complex, as it has been going on for several decades (starting in the 
1960s) and covers 27 sovereign countries that each have applicable domestic regulation. Due to 
the difference, it is difficult to assess how much of previous literature on U.S. MCA of 1980 
actually applies to EU deregulation and in particular cabotage. The majority of peer reviewed 
papers on market deregulation and cabotage focus on the maritime business (e.g., Miller and 
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Deacon, 2017; Paixão Casaca and Lyridis, 2018), the airline sector (e.g., Button, 2017; Williams , 
2017; Czerny et al., 2018), or the rail freight segment (e.g., Crozet, 2016; Laroche et al., 2017). 
 The EU road freight market deregulation is widely covered in newspapers and magazines 
(so-called grey literature), but it is rarely discussed in academic research, as noted by Lafontaine 
and Valeri (2009). The few studies (see Table I) that have been published are often influenced by 
a principal sponsor or the study is not peer-reviewed. 
 
Table I. 
A selection of studies of road freight cabotage in the EU 
Author(s) Year Title Principal 
Baybliss 2012 Report of the High Level Group on the 
Development of the EU Road Haulage Market 
European Commission 







Marktbeobachtung Güterverkehr. Bericht Herbst 
2013 
German Federal Ministry of 
Transport 
Hendrickx et al.  2013 The impact of untightening of cabotage: 
executive summary 




(Kelleher et al.) 





2014 Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the State of the 
Union Road Transport Market 
European Commission 
AK EUROPA 2014 AK position paper on the European Commission 
Report on the State of the EU Road Transport 
Market 
Austrian Federal Chamber 
of Labour 
Sternberg et al. 2014 A study on the movement of international 
vehicles in Denmark 
Authors 
Sternberg et al.  2015 Cabotagestudien: A study on trucking 
deregulation in Scandinavia and beyond 
Authors 
Broughton et al.  2015 Employment conditions in the International 
Road Haulage Sector 
European parliament 
Kummer et al.  2017 Quantitative analysis of cabotage in Austria Austrian Federal Economic 
Chamber, Austrian Road 
Haulage Association and 
Trade union vida 
De Wispelaere and 
Pacolet 
2018 Economic Analysis of the Road Freight 
Transport Sector in Belgium Within a European 
Context: Employees and Employers in ‘Survival 
Mode’? 
European Centre for 
Workers’ Questions EZA 
Falk and 
Danielsson 
2018 Intention and reality of “Combined 
transportation” – insights from Sweden 
The Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation & The 
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 Out of these reports and investigations, only Sternberg and Lantz (2018) have addressed the 
logistics implications of deregulation, by looking at the increasing risks for freight transportation 
caused by adverse conditions following EU deregulation. Despite the deficit of current research, a 
preliminary synthesis of the literature content led us to three factors that will influence the 
expansion of cabotage: 1) EU-regulations set the framework of cabotage, 2) differences in 
operating costs and labour wages between EU15 and EU12 countries will foster cabotage growth, 
and 3) the availability of truck drivers, especially low cost truck drivers, favours cabotage. 
 
2.2 EU-regulations as an influencing factor of cabotage 
Regarding relevant EU-regulations, two different types have to be distinguished: the linked and 
the non-linked cabotage. The main goal of the “linked cabotage” regulation is to reduce empty 
runs. Therefore, the “three-in-seven” rule is foreseen to be replaced by a “five-day flat rate” 
(Teleroute, 2018). As a result, cabotage is limited to five days from the moment of crossing the 
border of the cabotage host country, but there would be no limit on the number of trips that can be 
executed during the five-day time period. Additionally, the prerequisite to fully unload the truck 
prior to cabotage ceases to apply. Compared to the current rule (a limit of three cabotage trips in 
seven days), this rule grants the hauliers more flexibility to reduce their empty runs, but also creates 
opportunity for using cabotage as a business model to maximize the utilization of low-wage 
drivers. 
 The “non-linked cabotage” regulation results in the total deregulation of the cabotage market 









domestic market for 50 days per driver per year. Therefore, in contrast to the current law, no 
preceding international travel is required. However, there are two obstacles. First, the core 
conditions of the Posted Workers’ Directive, EC No 1072/2009 (2009), apply. This directive 
ensures strict insurance and social requirements are fulfilled by all cabotage operators. Second, the 
driver has to complete a registration in a web-based database and complete an online schedule 
prior to conducting cabotage operations. Setting up this EU-wide registration tool might take some 
time and delay the market opening. A potential advantage of this regulation is that the restriction 
of 50 days per year can be adjusted to the quality standard (emission classification) of the vehicle 
(e.g. trucks with higher emission engines are only allowed 30 days) and to the desired pace of 
market opening. Hendrickx (2013) gave a comprehensive review of the High Level Group Report 
and calculated the maximum possible cabotage penetration rates for three scenarios: current 
regulation, linked cabotage, and non-linked cabotage. He estimated that under current restrictions, 
the maximum possible cabotage penetration rate in the EU15 market would be 21 percent. His 
calculation was based on the assumption that after each international transport trip three cabotage 
journeys take place by EU12 operators. In the case of a linked cabotage regulation becoming 
applicable, the 21 percent estimate could rise as high as 29 percent. An even higher rate is 
conceivable if one adds “fake” trips, i.e. international trips (loaded or empty) that operators solely 
undertake to have the right to conduct cabotage later on.6 Cheu et al. (2019) empirically 
investigated to what extent logistics firms are “neutralizing” freight documents, as in creating fake 
trips. They found that 66 percent of the firms would do it if requested by their customers.  
 
                                              
6 This phenomenon was described by two of the industry experts interviewed. 
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2.3 Operating costs as an influencing factor of cabotage 
According to Kummer et al. (2014) operating costs and especially labour costs and motor vehicle 
taxes are the prime reasons for adopting flagging out strategies (i.e. moving operations from 
Western to Eastern European countries to take advantage of lower costs). Subsequently, the 
flagged out trucks will be active in the origin country and thereby conducting cabotage and 
increasing the penetration rate. The European Commission (2014) argues that the cost difference 
has been constantly decreasing and will most likely continue to do so in the future, whereas, others 
like Sternberg et al. (2015) and Sitran and Pastori (2013) suggest that the gap will slowly (or never) 
narrow due to liberal labour immigration rules and the large number of non-EU citizens willing to 
work for low wages. Evidence found by de Wispelaere and Pacolet (2018) indicated that many 
hauliers operating in Belgium were so called “letter-box companies”, i.e. companies registering a 
mailbox (without any actual operations at that address) in an EU12 country in order to hire crews 
of convenience or evade taxes. 
 
2.4 Truck drivers as an influencing factor of cabotage 
Forecasting the speed of diffusion of low-cost freight services in the European transport market is 
inherently difficult (Hazen et al., 2012). Market adoption can be generally modelled as a sigmoid 
function (i.e. S-curve) (Majahan et al., 1991; Rogers, 2003). The flexibility of hauliers in terms of 
flagging out to achieve cost advantages has been shown by Kummer et al. (2014), who considered 
the low margins of the industry that are often a survival measure to maintain competitiveness. 
 In contrast to the rigorous work immigration rules of countries like the U.S. and Japan, each 
country in the EU handles work immigration differently. While some EU countries have strict 
requirements for guest workers, other EU countries have generous policies allowing for a virtually 
-13- 
unlimited number of drivers from outside the EU. The driver shortages of EU12 countries are 
addressed by generous work immigration policies with several companies employing drivers from 
countries such as Ukraine, Russia, Macedonia, or the Philippines (Hilal, 2008; Mabasa, 2018). 
One of the experts interviewed, a CEO of a 1,300-truck haulier firm, confirmed this: “The more 
you go east, the easier it is to find drivers. We are not facing any driver shortages in East Europe.” 
 
3. Research methodology 
3.1 Research approach 
To close the knowledge gap and to answer the questions in the field of study, multiple research 
methods were used (i.e. statistical analysis, literature review, and complementary interviews). This 
approach to researching contemporary supply chain issues has been recommended by numerous 
researchers (e.g. Sanders and Wagner, 2011; Wieland et al., 2016). We chose Germany, which is 
Europe’s largest economy, as the focal logistics market. 
 First, calculations based on Eurostat data were conducted to examine the impact of freight 
deregulation until present (e.g. it is calculated how the share of East European operators changes 
in Germany over time). The Eurostat data sources that we used are listed in Table II. To calculate 
the adjusted cabotage share, for example, the own account TKM has to be deducted from national 
TKM to ensure that some of the “non-feasible” cabotage journeys are not included. Future 
potential cabotage penetration rates are calculated by applying regression analysis. Specifically, 
the existing trendline is extended beyond the actual data (2008–2018) in two different scenarios 
(using linear and S-curve trend lines, as will be rationalized further on) to predict future cabotage 
shares. We chose to start from 2008, which was the first year with EC No 1072/2009 (2009).  Our 
analysis goes through the most recent data available via Eurostat. 
-14- 
Table II. 
Eurostat data used in the analysis 
Labour cost index by NACE Rev. 2 activity - nominal value, annual data (2020a) 
Labour cost, wages and salaries, direct remuneration by NACE Rev. 1.1 activity - LCS 
survey 2008 
(2020b) 
Modal split of freight transport (2020c) 
Road cabotage by reporting country and country in which cabotage takes place (2020d) 
Road cabotage transport by country in which cabotage takes place (2020e) 
Summary of annual road freight transport by type of operation and type of transport (2020f) 
Weekly oil bulletin (2020g) 
 
 Second, we performed a review of a variety of related documents (articles, reports, 
magazines, newspapers, etc.) to estimate the likelihood of scenarios and determine what 
requirements and assumptions need to be fulfilled. 
 Third, in addition to the Eurostat analysis and the narrative review of related documents, we 
consulted with renowned EU transportation experts who represent various stakeholders. These 
experts were identified from scholarly and practitioner articles, government reports, and Eurostat.  
In total, 25 experts were consulted with a variety of questions related to their expertise (see Table 
III). Interviews were carried out as short conversations over the phone and, when necessary, by 
email. We asked open-ended questions to obtain their perception of the current state of cabotage 
and future market developments. Please note that their views and thoughts loosely informed our 
propositions and were mainly used for ideation on the area. Their opinions were not considered as 
facts, but rather representing their organizations’ stance on the European road transport 




Senior transport researchers/university professors from Poland, Austria, Italy and France 6 
EC transport experts 3 
Eurostat managers and experts 3 
German Transport Authority Representatives 3 
-15- 
Representatives of various logistics and transport industry associations 3 
German National Bureau of Statistics experts 2 
Journalists 2 
Chairman of the board of a major German logistics service provider 1 
Consultant 1 
Senior manager of road transportation from a major German logistics service provider 1 
 
3.2 Data collection 
According to Eurostat’s official statistics for Germany, the cabotage penetration rate increased by 
195 percent from 2008 to 2018, indicating a compound annual growth rate of 10.4 percent. The 
own account journeys (i.e. companies carrying their own goods) are deducted from the total 
national road transport journeys. Therefore, the denominator only includes national hire or reward 
journeys (carried out by professional providers of road haulage services). In Germany, the own 
account journeys make up approximately 17 percent of the total national journeys (Eurostat, 
2020f). This first adjustment is consistent with the approach by Baybliss (2012). 
 Several of the experts interviewed who represented independent research and industries, 
journalism, and trade organizations, stated that the cabotage statistics are underestimated. Other 
sources such as reports, indicate that the figures might be incorrect (e.g. de Wispelaere and Pacolet, 
2018). It is well-established that long-distance trucking represents a “statistical vacuum” because 
many countries do not even try to collect information about cabotage operations from their national 
hauliers (McKinnon and Leonardi, 2009). Some interviewees believed cabotage to be 50 to 100 
percent higher than stated by Eurostat. Sternberg et al. (2014) and Sternberg et al. (2015) 
confirmed the underestimation of EU12 haulier activities. According to the Eurostat officials 
interviewed, some of the new member states also have insufficient routines (both on the authority 
and haulier levels) to collect adequate data. Hence, a second adjustment of the underlying data 
consists of adding a conservative 25 percent to the officially reported cabotage journeys to include 
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those by countries that are not part of the EU (e.g. Ukraine or Turkey) as their cabotage trips are 
not reported officially. 
 An important distinction to make is the actual extent in percentage of the domestic freight 
market that is penetrable by cabotage. Because the current regulation stipulates that a foreign 
haulier needs to have an international transport coming into the country, shipments of domestic 
construction material or forestry produce are unsuitable for cabotage. That applies to local 
distribution, for example, where only cities bordering on a low-cost country are feasible cabotage 
targets. Hence, this paper applies the logic and selection criteria of Sternberg et al. (2014), which 
makes 53 percent of the total German freight market the maximum theoretically feasible 
penetration rate of cabotage (given the current regulation). 
 The costs include the two biggest components, fuel and labour, as well as vehicle taxes. As 
claimed by Guihery (2009), it becomes apparent that there remains a large gap between EU15 and 
EU12 member states. Moreover, the gap has been consistent over the last eleven years. Data 
indicates that this spread is mainly attributable to different labour costs and social protection 
systems (AK EUROPA, 2014). 
 Table IV shows that the EU road haulage market deals with diverse labour costs, but 
relatively aligned fuel prices. We illustrate this using Bulgaria and Germany data. While the 
average labour cost in Germany is more than 6.4 times higher than that of Bulgaria (25.8 € vs. 4.0 
€), the average fuel price including duties and taxes are relatively similar (1.28 € vs. 1.12€ per liter 
of diesel) (Eurostat, 2020a, 2020b, 2020g). In contrast to the European Commission (2013) and 
Kelleher (2014), research shows that there is still little convergence between the labour costs of 
old and new EU member states within the road haulage market (AK EUROPA, 2014; Kummer et 




Labour costs and fuel prices comparison  
 
Total labour cost 
(in € per hour) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Germany 24.0 24.8 25.5 24.7 25.9 25.5 25.5 26.2 27.3 27.1 27.5 
Bulgaria (BG)   3.1   3.3   3.7   3.8   3.8   3.9   4.0   4.2   4.3   4.8   5.3 
Czech Republic (CZ)   9.3   9.8 10.0   9.9 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.5 10.9 11.8 12.6 
Poland (PL)   7.4   7.5   7.7   7.9   8.0   8.3   8.6   8.8   9.0   9.4 10.0 
Fuel price including duties/taxes 
(in € per litre) 
Germany 1.33 1.07 1.20 1.38 1.57 1.46 1.38 1.14 1.14 1.17 1.33 
Bulgaria (BG) 1.09   .84   .99 1.16 1.33 1.36 1.33 1.10   .96 1.00 1.14 
Czech Republic (CZ) 1.29 1.05 1.24 1.41 1.52 1.42 1.33 1.12 1.04 1.10 1.27 
Poland (PL) 1.23 0.88 1.08 1.16 1.39 1.31 1.24 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.16 
 
 
4. Research propositions 
4.1 Impact of the rise of East European operators 
A cabotage host is the country where the cabotage takes place. Germany is one of the primary 
cabotage hosts in Europe and the cabotage share of national transports has increased significant ly 
since 2008. The penetration rate has increased by more than 377 percent between 2008 and 2018, 
indicating a compound annual growth rate of 15.3 percent. The East European member states 
(EU12) were first allowed to engage in the cabotage market in 2009. 
 The top line in Figure 2 illustrates the adjusted cabotage share in Germany. In contrast to the 
bottom line, there are two adjustments. First, the journeys on own account are deducted from the 
total national journeys. Therefore, the denominator only includes national hire or reward journeys. 
The journeys on own account make up 16.8 percent of total national journeys on average (Eurostat, 
2020f). This adjustment is consistent with the approach by Baybliss (2012). The second adjustment 
consists of adding 25 percent to the officially reported cabotage journeys to include cabotage 
journeys by countries which are not part of the EU (e.g. Ukraine or Turkey) and cabotage journeys 
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which are not reported (AK EUROPA, 2014). According to interviewed Eurostat officials, some 
of the new member states also have insufficient routines (both on authority and haulier levels) to 
collect adequate data, as confirmed by previous investigations. This is roughly based on a “Maut 




Cabotage share of national transport in Germany (Eurostat, 2020d, 2020e, 2020f) 
 
 The adjustments result in significant higher absolute values of cabotage shares. In 
Germany, the gap is 4,744 million TKMs in 2018 (9.9 percent [adjusted] vs. 6.9 percent). The fact 
that the compound annual growth rate from 2008 to 2018 for own account on national TKM is -
4.6 percent implies that the trend of increased use of EU-12 cabotage hauliers is likely to continue 
(Eurostat, 2020d, 2020e, 2020f). Given this analysis, Proposition 1 is: 
P1: The cabotage penetration by EU-12 hauliers will continue to increase in Germany. 
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 The surge of total generated cabotage TKM since 2008 is due to the drastic increase of 
cabotage TKM hauled by BG, CZ, and PL (see Figure 3). The CAGR of the total cabotage TKM 
from 2008 to 2018 was 15.3 percent. BG, CZ, and PL represented the largest increase with a CAGR 
of 39.1 percent. During the same period, the EU15 CAGR was -4.1 percent. Consequently, this 
can be regarded as an early sign that cabotage deregulation results in a surge of East European 
operators in Germany (Eurostat, 2020d, 2020e, 2020f). Regarding the development of East 
European operators, we formulate Proposition 2: 





Percentage of cabotage in Germany (Eurostat, 2020d, 2020e, 2020f). 
 
 

























Assuming Proposition 2 holds valid, the freight market deregulation (i.e. increased cabotage 
penetration rates) in the EU will result in a surge of East European operators within Germany. This 
shift will intensify the competition in the European road haulage market and force the old EU 
member states to reduce their operating costs. Thus, as road haulage becomes cheaper, rail freight 
transport with its country-specific technical and organizational challenges will become less 
attractive thwarting EC efforts to promote a modal shift from road to rail (Ambra et al., 2019; 
European Commission, 2019). Similar results were seen in the U.S. after the MCA of 1980 (Moore, 
1986). Table V shows that the modal split in the EU27 has been stable. Therefore, we present 
Proposition 3: 
P3: The cabotage deregulation has thwarted EC efforts to promote a modal shift from road 
to rail. 
Table V. 
Modal split development in the EU28 (Eurostat, 2020c) 
Modes 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Road 75.5 77.0 75.7 75.0 74.6 74.8 74.8 75.3 76.2 76.7 
Rail 18.1 16.9 17.4 18.7 18.5 18.3 18.4 18.2 17.6 17.3 
Inland waterways   6.5   6.2   6.9   6.3   6.8   6.9   6.8   6.5   6.3   6.0 
Change of road 
share (Base is 2008)    1.5%  0.3%  -0.4%  -0.7%  -0.6%  -0.6%  -0.1%   0.7%   1.3% 
 
4.3 Impact on the development of empty runs 
The surge of East European operators intensifies the competition in the German road haulage 
market and forces the local hauliers to reduce their operating costs. Thus, the overall road haulage 
operating costs will decline. As highlighted by Sternberg et al. (2015), empty runs increase with 
decreasing costs, because the haulier will breakeven earlier und thus is able to operate with less 
loaded trucks. 
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 The distinction between cabotage empty runs and overall domestic empty runs is important. 
A certain amount of empty runs is inevitable due to geographic imbalances and specific 
characteristics of goods (McKinnon and Ge, 2006). According to the latest Eurostat figures, 23 
percent of all transports are empty runs (excluding partially empty runs). Figure 4 includes the 
share of empty vehicle-km in total vehicle-km, but it neglects the many vehicle-km that are driven 
with only partially loaded trucks. Consequently, the average utilization rate of trucks is low. 
 
Figure 4. 
Share of empty vehicle-km in total vehicle-km by type of transport in 2012, based on data from 
21 of the 27 EU countries in 2012 (no data available from BE, IT, CY, MT, RO and UK). Source: 
European Commission (2014, p. 8) 
 
 While national empty runs are slightly above average with 25 percent, empty runs of national 
road freight transport undertaken by a foreign haulier (= cabotage) are almost twice as high (about 
50 percent). Given the previous propositions, we put forward Proposition 4: 
P4: The cabotage deregulation results in increased national empty runs in Germany. 
 
5. Discussion 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Average overall transport operations
Vehicle registered in Country A driving
from Country B to Country C (cross-trade)
Vehicle registered in Country A driving
from Country A to Country B or vice versa
(bilateral)
Vehicle registered in Country A driving
within Country B (cabotage if loaded)
Vehicle registered in Country A driving
within Country A (national transport)
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In this section, we will address the propositions presented in the previous section. By using a 
simple regression analysis, the existing trendline is extended until 2025 beyond the actual data 
(2008–2018). We define two different scenarios to predict future cabotage shares. The “steady-
state growth” of Scenario 1 is extrapolating the future cabotage development with a linear function. 
Within the “realistic growth” Scenario 2, we assume an exponential function. We will forecast the 
cabotage penetration rate for ten years and present the corresponding trendline equations and R-
squared values. In order to discuss the robustness of the two scenarios examined, we will follow 
the argumentation of the factors introduced in Section 4 and the outcome of the interviews. 
 
5.1 Cabotage and the rise of East European operators 
In Scenario 1, we assume simple linear growth as is often done in reports. Figure 5 shows that the 
adjusted cabotage share has risen 2.4 percent in 2008 to 9.9 percent in 2018 and is estimated to top 
16 percent in 2025. Fitting a line to the Eurostat data collected yields an intercept of -16.845 and 
a regression coefficient of .008. As demonstrated by the R2 of 97.4 percent, time accounts for 




Linear increase of the cabotage share in Germany (2008–2025) (Eurostat, 2020d, 2020e, 2020f) 
 
 The cabotage share exhibits a predicted value of 16.1 percent in 2025. The combination of 
stricter regulations, a lack of German, Eastern European, and English-speaking, non-EU drivers 
(or stricter immigration policies in EU12 countries) could potentially set the conditions for the 
linear scenario in Figure 5. As already explained, Scenario 1—the steady state case—contradicts 
current research and coverage. Nevertheless, it could occur if transport workers’ unions and other 
deregulation opponents overrule political institutions. In this regard, we would also like to mention 
that even a decrease of cabotage in Germany is possible if, for example, the EU releases a law that 
prohibits EU12 operators from large-scale use of low-wage drivers in EU15 countries (such as was 
attempted recently through trying to enforce minimum wages on international truck drivers) 














































Series1 Linear (Series1) Linear (Series1)
y = .008x - 16.845
R2 = .974
Cabotage Share in Germany Linear E timation
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 In Scenario 2, we look into a plausible increase of cabotage (see Figure 6), according to the 
following assumptions: 
• Assumption 2.1 “New regulations will fully deregulate and open the market.” The scenario 
assumes a complete deregulation of the market. The EC is a strong proponent of a Single 
European Transport Area and has already elaborated detailed options to deregulate the 
market, making this option a highly likely one. 
• Assumption 2.2 “Operating cost gap between EU15 and EU12 remains.” Concerning 
costs, it can be assumed that the gap between EU15 and EU12 member states remains 
constantly high. As discussed, the two main costs are fuel and labour. Fuel prices are, 
however, already today more or less the same, as they are linked to the global economy 
(Baybliss, 2012; Eurostat, 2020g) and are harmonized by Council Directive 2003/96/EC 
(European Commission, 2003). Labour costs, on the other hand, have not converged over 
the last decade (European Commission, 2019; Eurostat, 2020a, 2020b). Thus, it is assumed 
that this trend will continue. 
• Assumption 2.3 “Lack of ‘German’ drivers and continuous surplus of EU12 drivers.” The 
EU15 driver shortage seems to be perpetual. This is not going to change with the increasing 
usage of autonomous driving (Michigan State University, 2018). Quite the contrary, just 
for 2017, there was a shortage of more than 45,000 truck drivers in Germany alone (Birger, 
2017). Driving a truck is considered an unattractive occupation (Prockl et al., 2017) and 
the salary is relatively low compared to other professions. Thus, we can assume that there 





Estimated S-curve for cabotage share in Germany (2000–2050) (Eurostat, 2020d, 2020e, 2020f) 
 
 As of 2018, the current cabotage share of 9.9 percent was calculated by dividing the adjusted 
cabotage TKM (23.7 billion) by the total German TKM (276.2 billion) minus the own account 
TKM (37.4 billion). Assuming an annual growth rate of 2 percent (as expected in most Western 
countries) for the national hire and reward TKM in Germany would add up to nearly 300 billion 
TKM in 2025. A cabotage rate of 25 percent would thus assume 75 billion TKM of cabotage. 
 Poland increased its cabotage TKM in Germany from approximately 0.95 billion TKM in 
2008 to 16.6 billion TKM in 2018; this equals a CAGR of 30 percent. Looking at Poland’s adjusted 
cabotage TKM and assuming a modest 25 percent growth rate over the next five years suggests 
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that Poland alone (without the other EU12 countries or other East European countries) could 
account for 79 billion TKM of cabotage in Germany by 2025. 
 By 2025, we argue that a cabotage share of 25 percent is possible in some of the EU15 
member states, particularly in Germany. Our findings are consistent with the study by the Policy 
Research Corporation (Hendrickx, 2013). 
 A final reason for the strong increase of cabotage share is that most of the big German 
companies support this change by contracting foreign hauliers instead of German hauliers; one 
interviewed logistics service provider stated they currently use cabotage for 25 percent of their 
German domestic hauls. Thus, the procurement of German companies is fostering cabotage in 
Germany. Available data, previous studies, and expert opinion supports Proposition 1: The 
cabotage penetration will continue to increase in Germany, as well as Proposition 2: The cabotage 
deregulation results in a surge of East European operators in Germany. 
 
5.2 Cabotage and the changes of modal splits 
We investigated whether cabotage deregulation has had any effect on modal shift. Looking at the 
data in Table VI, the EC efforts to expand rail transportation has not yielded a significant change 
in the modal split in Germany (European Commission, 2011; Islam et al., 2015; European 
Commission, 2019). 
Table VI. 
Modal split in Germany (Eurostat, 2020c) 
Modes 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Road 70.0 71.8 70.5 71.3 70.8 70.7 71.3 71.6 72.4 73.4 
Rail 19.3 17.9 18.7 19.3 19.1 19.1 18.8 19.3 18.8 17.8 
Inland waterways 10.7 10.4 10.8   9.4 10.1 10.2   9.9   9.1   8.8   8.8 
Change of road 
share (Base is 2008)  2.6% 0.7% 1.9% 1.1% 1.0% 1.9% 2.3% 3.4% 4.9% 
 
-27- 
 Recent studies (Visser and Francke, 2010; Hendrickx, 2013) indicate that decreasing road 
transport prices may trigger a modal shift from rail to road, which is contrary to EC efforts to 
encourage rail usage. In the next few years, however, a backwards modal shift initiated through 
cabotage is unlikely, because a cabotage share of 6.5 percent is too little to affect the entire 
transport market (Bundesamt für Güterverkehr, 2010). When cabotage will affect the entire market 
is uncertain, but it seems likely that a BG, CZ, and PL cabotage share of over 16 percent in 2025 
would have an effect. 
 As cabotage penetration rates increase and road transport prices fall, EC efforts to promote 
a shift to rail transportation has been and will likely continue to be unsuccessful (European 
Commission, 2019). Hence, we find support for Proposition 3: The cabotage deregulation has 
thwarted EC efforts to promote a modal shift from road to rail. 
 
5.3 Cabotage and the development of empty runs 
At the present time, there is no direct link between cabotage empty runs and national empty runs, 
because cabotage only accounts for a relatively small percentage (about 6.5 percent) of the entire 
market. Therefore, the two segments are first analysed individually and afterwards assessed 
together (see Table VII). 
 
Table VII. 
Effects in the cabotage and national market, assuming cabotage reaches a tipping point 
 Cabotage market National market (without cabotage) Entire market 
Cost Constant or marginally increasing 
Decreasing due to foreign 
competition Decreasing 
Empty 
runs Slightly decreasing 
Increasing due to decreasing 
costs (shipper stronger than 
haulier) 
Increasing since effect of 




 Cabotage deregulation has contributed to a decrease of empty runs in the cabotage market. 
According to Hendrickx (2013), a further deregulation of the cabotage rules will not result in a 
further decrease in empty runs, as the current “three-in-seven” rule already grants an efficient 
possibility to reduce empty runs. We assume that a slight decrease will take place, because the 
cabotage empty runs are at a relatively high level compared to national empty runs (about 50 
percent vs. 25 percent) and therefore, offer huge potential to improve average utilization. With 
regard to costs, it can be assumed that they will remain constant or marginally increase due to their 
low level as compared to the higher costs in Germany. 
 Assuming that cabotage reaches a share of 20–25 percent, lower transport costs will increase 
empty runs in the national market (without cabotage). We believe that if 25 percent of all national 
trips are driven by East European low-wage drivers, then German drivers will have to lower their 
costs to stay competitive. As a result, overall transport costs in Germany will decrease. Shippers 
will increase empty runs, because they can afford less efficient trips due to the lower costs. Hauliers 
have incentives to decrease empty runs as a result of cost pressure, but due to their small size and 
limited network, consolidation of freight is not always possible (McKinnon and Ge, 2006). Clearly, 
shippers have the power (Pålsson and Kovács, 2014). 
 Hence, we summarize there are some indications supporting Proposition 4 “The cabotage 
deregulation results in increased national empty runs in Germany”. Transport costs in the entire 
market will likely decrease and empty runs will increase, since the “domestic” effect is stronger 




Over ten million people in the EU work with logistics and freight transportation and it is critical 
for freight transport and logistics researchers and policymakers alike to understand fully the 
dynamics of the trucking market. This paper contributes to the still insufficiently explored field of 
road freight cabotage in the EU. Further research is highly encouraged in order to determine 
adequate policies for financial, environmental, and social sustainability. A major share of previous 
investigations have not been published in scholarly journals, have often been presented in 
languages not spoken by the larger scientific community (e.g. German, Swedish, Danish and 
Dutch), or have been carried out by non-independent investigators. This paper has systemized and 
amplified existing knowledge on the European deregulation by providing support concerning the 
impacts of the cabotage deregulation until now. This paper represents an empirical and unbiased 
point of view, in contrast to the reports of the EC (pro-deregulation) or reports of the haulage 
associations and labour unions (anti-deregulation). The study at hand has addressed some of the 
research void in the intersection between public policy and SCM (Pagell et al., 2018). 
 Cabotage plays a more important role than officially reported. If one adjusts the official value 
by deducting own account TKM and adjusting for both non-EU trips and “shadow trips,” cabotage 
by BG, CZ, and PL reached approximately 10 percent share of Germany’s national transport in 
2018. Cabotage penetration has increased significantly since 2009 because of the removal of 
access restrictions from EU12 to EU15 countries. Between 2008 and 2018, the cabotage share 
transported by BG, CZ, and PL within Germany has risen from 8 percent to 67 percent while the 
cabotage share transported by EU15 countries within Germany has decreased from 81 percent to 
11 percent (Eurostat, 2020d). 
 To answer our two research questions (RQs), we elaborated on four research propositions. 
Cabotage in Germany will most likely represent a significant share of national transport five years 
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from now. Assuming the adoption of low-cost carriers follows an S-shaped curve, an EU12 
cabotage share in Germany as high as 25 percent would be possible by 2025. The same may be 
true for other EU15 member states (Kummer et al., 2014). 
 
6.1 Future research directions 
We found sparse academic research on EU trucking deregulation and scholars of transport 
economics and SCM alike are encouraged to investigate further the road transport deregulation. 
Thereby, EU deregulation is relatively more complex than the North American trucking 
deregulation due to the multitude of countries and legislations involved. Subsequent endeavours 
in this field could focus on analysing the variety of cabotage business models and their impact on 
the markets as well as their impact on the configuration of supply chains. Furthermore, we suggest 
researching how geographical proximity in Europe affects cabotage and conducting comparative 
studies between the U.S. MCA of 1980 and EU road freight deregulation. 
 We also call for future research into how managerial practice can ensure environmental and 
social sustainability along the supply chain, amplifying the call by Nakamba et al. (2017). This 
research need has been further motivated by ample anecdotal evidence of exploited drivers (Hilal, 
2008; Mabasa, 2018). The haulier selection literature (e.g. Meixell and Norbis, 2008) has mainly 
applied a U.S. perspective, but this paper highlights the need for incorporating a more contextual 
understanding in haulier selection theory development in general as well as country specific 
investigations in particular. 
 Our analysis is based on Eurostat data, due to a lack of other data sources. Future research 
on methods to acquire complementary data for analysis is needed. According to Eurostat data, 
previous research, and interviews with experts, cabotage is clearly affecting the entire market and 
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has thwarted the EC effort to shift transport from road to rail and has increased national empty 
runs. Our projections based on existing data and theory are contrary to what several policymakers 
are stating, i.e. that further European deregulation will decrease empty-runs. 
 Given our elaboration on Eurostat data, further freight market deregulation, will most likely 
fail to have a positive impact on the environment, as it triggers a higher amount of empty runs, 
thwarts EC efforts to encourage the use of rail, and increases the number of inefficient vehicles 
through the increasing share of the East European fleets (Visser and Francke, 2010; Hendrickx, 
2013). 
 An increasing number of recent reports and papers are addressing misconduct in the transport 
industry, such as document fraud (Cheu et al., 2019), theft (Sternberg and Lantz, 2018), violation 
of cabotage regulations (Kummer et al., 2017) and fake corporations (letterbox companies) (de 
Wispelaere and Pacolet, 2018). Hence, future research is advised to create a research agenda for 
addressing misconduct in the transport industry, by applying supply chain theories (e.g. principal-
agent theory (Ouchi, 1979)) or criminology theory (e.g. strain theory (Agnew, 1992)). 
 
6.2 Implications for management 
 The paper at hand provides logistics managers with insight into the deregulation of the 
European road freight market. We emphasised that regulations, operating costs, and truck drivers 
form the main influencing factors of the road freight market. Thus, logistics managers looking at 
future strategy are advised to take the trends addressed in this paper into consideration, especially 
while addressing strategic themes in the haulier business (Borgström et al., 2017). Such a strategic 
theme should be an important decision criteria for carrier selection. EU12 hauliers represent 
significant cost savings; however, these cost savings come at an environmental price as modal shift 
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and fill rates suffer (Hendrickx, 2013). As the access to low-cost hauliers increases through gradual 
deregulation of European road transportation, logistics managers looking at minimizing cost are 
advised caution when investing in intermodal transportation projects. The reason is that, while the 
trend towards low-cost hauliers is clear, negative externalities (Sternberg and Lantz, 2018) can 
harm social sustainability efforts. The trade-off between cost and sustainability merits serious 
consideration. Additionally, as foreign hauliers and cabotage operations become more common 
and increasingly replace domestic hauliers, the operational implications (e.g., ensuring security 
regulations such as language requirements when handling dangerous goods) will become 
increasingly important. 
 
6.3 Implications for policy 
 The increase in cabotage will cause an increased environmental impact and put pressure on 
working conditions for drivers working in Germany. Salary differences are decreasing, but will 
likely remain significant over the next decades. The negative impact on the environment is a result 
of older and more polluting trucks (Bundesamt für Güterverkehr, 2010), decreasing fill-rates, and 
an increase of road freight transportation in general. Hence, policymakers are advised that further 
deregulation is likely to counter EC efforts to promote a shift from road to rail. Furthermore, our 
research implies that infrastructure planning needs to take into consideration the surge of East 
European trucks. This surge means that tens of thousands of truck drivers will be living in their 
trucks and will need additional infrastructure (e.g., rest areas). Policymakers also need to consider 
how the increasing externalities of cabotage can be internalized. That is, how can the companies 
benefiting most from low-cost East European hauliers be made responsible for the negative 
effects? Finally, we would like to conclude with a quote from an interviewee, a manager at one of 
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Germany’s largest logistics service providers: “Liberalizing the cabotage market has created new 
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